Modelling Institutions Using Dynamic Deontics

We have developed a refined institutional scheme derived from Crawford and Ostrom's Grammar of Institutions (also referred to as ADICO) that has been adapted for the detailed representation of conventions, norms, and rules. In this work we apply this schema to model the emergence of norms. While previous work in the area of normative agent systems largely represents obligation and prohibition norms by discrete deontic primitives (e.g.a'must', 'must not', 'may'), we propose the concept of dynamic deontics to represent a continuous perspective on emerging institutions. This supports the expression of norm salience based on the differentiated internal representation among participants. To demonstrate how it can be operationalised for dynamic modelling of norms in artificial societies, we apply nADICO to a simple agent-based simulation. Our intention is to arrive at a dynamic modelling of institutions in general, facilitating a movement beyond the artificial boundaries between different institution types, while making the institutional grammar purposeful for a wide range of application domains.

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