论文信息 - AN ITERATIVE AUCTION MECHANISM FOR COMBINATORIAL LOGISTICS EXCHANGES

AN ITERATIVE AUCTION MECHANISM FOR COMBINATORIAL LOGISTICS EXCHANGES

Transportation or logistics exchanges help shippers and carriers to save costs and increase their revenue at the same time. Auction based models are increasingly becoming popular as the negotiation model in such exchanges. In this paper, we propose an iterative auction model for efficiently solving the allocation problem in combinatorial logistics exchanges which allow combinatorial bidding by both shippers and carriers.

Y. Narahari | Shantanu Biswas | Y. Narahari | S. Biswas

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