Transaction Cost Economics

The study of the governance of economic organization has become a lively and diverse field of research over the last four decades. This chapter describes the fundamental ideas of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as these evolved in the 1970's to offer a methodology through which to analyze how the governance of economic organization has economizing consequences.

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