An integrative framework of pre‐emption strategies

This paper performs a review of the various pre‐emption strategies prescribed in the economics literature. These are cost superiority, consumers' switching cost, channel exclusivity, environmental barriers of entry and credible commitment to react aggressively. Through our analysis, we develop an integrative framework of the pre‐emption strategies that will result in long‐term payoffs to the firm. The framework proposes that there are two key dimensions—strategic advantage and strategic focus—and identify five generic types of pre‐emption strategies for market incumbents. These are the switching cost, blockade, credible commitment, tie‐up, and cost leadership strategies. The pre‐emption strategies and the framework presented can assist managerial decision‐making for the successful pre‐emption of potential competition to complement their existing efforts.

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