A MODERN WARFARE PARADIGM: RECONSIDERATION OF COMBAT POWER CONCEPT

World Wide Web, Information Technologies and Web-Enabled Collaborative Technologies 2.0 accelerate the process of globalization. In modern globalization process, these technologies dictates how information is designed and how information flow is used in global communication system. In such interactive global environment, Fourth Generation Warfare has emerged where people’s identities and beliefs are the primary source of conflict. Primary fight is held not between countries, but between cultures. It is obvious the nature of war has drastically changed and it almost eliminates the boundaries between the war and peace. Such an understanding generates a different view of modern warfare. From the modern perspective the main risks are directed to the state’s internal identity through people’s “hearts and minds” and society’s moods. People’s loyalty to attractive ideas and not to organizations is a major shift. It supports Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s main ideas winning wars without massive destruction by breaking down the enemy’s will and determination to fight with a limited use of military power. It is needed to reconsider not only the definitions of modern warfare and warfighting but also rethink the concept of combat power. It is obvious that the role of the military in peacetime activity must change significantly. Nevertheless, the new understanding rise a necessity to integrate the whole society and subjects of state in dealing with threats. The holistic defense approach is a new, more effective way of tackling modern security and sustainability issues of the states that need to be clearly defined.

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