论文信息 - On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

On the cores of cooperative games and the stability of the Weber set

In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is externally stable. As a consequence we can give a new characterization (th. 3.2) for the convexity of a cooperative game in terms of its stability (von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions) using the Weber set.

Carles Rafels | Stef Tijs

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