论文信息 - A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

A non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules of bankruptcy problems

First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided.

Chih Chang | Cheng-Cheng Hu

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