Agricultural Biotechnology Development and Policy in China

In the past three years, the growth rate has slowed for acres planted with genetically modified (GM) crops globally, in contrast to its rapid increase in the late 1990s (James, 2002). This slowdown may be due to worldwide conflicting views on biotechnology that not only affect global investment in the biotechnology industry, but also impact farmers’ adoption of this technology. Some, but not all, of these issues are present in China; however, China’s development of its biotechnology industry has been unique, catalyzed by the active involvement of the public sector. A survey of China’s plant biotechnologists by the authors and their collaborators in 2000 shows that China is developing the largest plant biotechnology capacity outside of North America (Huang, Rozelle, Pray, & Wang, 2002). In 1997, when the National Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) Biosafety Committee was established, this committee immediately approved 46 cases for field trials, environmental release, and commercialization, which covered 12 GM crops. Among them three cases of cotton, tomato, and petunia were approved for commercialization in certain locations (Huang, Wang, & Keeley, 2001).1 A number of earlier studies concluded that China adopted a promotional policy to embrace the benefits of biotechnology (Chen, 2000; Huang, Wang, Zhang, & Zepeda, 2001; Paarlberg, 2000). China became one of the world’s leading countries in biotechnology development. China also received criticism from biotechnology opponents for not paying enough attention to biosafety, the environment, consumer and food safety, and the potential impacts of biotechnology on China’s future agricultural trade position. However, the above perceptions regarding China’s position on agricultural biotechnology lasted for only a few years. In May 2001, China’s State Council decreed a new rule—Regulation on Safety Administration of Agricultural GMOs. And in early 2002, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) issued three detailed regulations on the biosafety management, trade and labeling of GM farm products.2 After these events, China received more criticism than support from both proponents and critics of biotechnology. For example, biotech scientists and biotech industry representatives criticized China’s new regulations as too restrictive to provide a favorable environment for the development of biotechnology. They called the period following 1999 as the “winter of biotechnology.” Alternatively, Greenpeace and environmental agencies continuously warned China of the potential risks associated with GMOs. International trade impacts occurred for both imports and exports. New regulations required importers of GM agricultural products to apply for official safety verification approval from China’s Ministry of Agriculture. This led the US government to accuse Beijing of using these new rules to hinder imports and protect Chinese soybean farmers.3 Pressure was also raised on the export side. China was frequently asked to certify that its agricultural exports to Japan and EU markets were free of GMOs. In addition, there has been growing criticism of China’s financial and institutional ability to label its GM farm products.