论文信息 - On Repeated Games with Complete Information

On Repeated Games with Complete Information

We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n-stage game and for the λ-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor.

Sylvain Sorin | S. Sorin

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