Regional differences in electricity distribution costs and their consequences for yardstick regulation of access prices

Abstract In this paper we estimate an average-cost function for a panel of 59 Swiss local and regional electricity distribution utilities as a basis for yardstick regulation of the distribution-network access prices. Shleifer (1985) proposed yardstick competition in terms of price to regulate local monopolies producing a homogeneous good. The regulated price for the individual firms depends on the average costs of identical firms. The yardstick competition concept can also be applied to firms that produce heterogeneous goods if these goods differ only in observable characteristics. To correct the yardstick for heterogeneity the regulator can use a multivariate estimation of an average-cost function. In the case of electricity distribution, the heterogeneity of output consists mainly of different characteristics of the distribution service areas. In this paper we follow Shleifer's suggestion to estimate a multivariate average-cost function that can be employed by the regulatory commission to benchmark network access prices at the distribution level. Several exogenous variables measuring the heterogeneity of the service areas were included in the cost model specification. We find that the regional differences of the service areas — e.g. area shares of forests, agricultural areas or unproductive land and population density — significantly influence electricity distribution costs.

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