Interactive Unawareness in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

In this paper, we modify the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) to model interactive unawareness of decision makers (DMs) about the options available to them in the conflict. More specifically, we consider a GMCR with two DMs, where a DM, in some given state, can be unconscious about some of his options, or about the options of his opponent, and therefore, may have only a partial knowledge of the state space. By interactive unawareness, it is meant that a DM can reason about the awareness level of the other DM and about the awareness level of the other DM regarding his or her own awareness level and so on. We generalize standard solution concepts for this model and illustrate its usefulness by means of a hypothetical war conflict.

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