Foundational belief change

This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann'sminimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the “supplementary postulates” of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of safe (base) contraction so as to make it maxichoice.

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