论文信息 - Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Bettina Klaus | Lars Ehlers | B. Klaus | Lars Ehlers

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