Experimental economics and experimental computer science: a survey

In surprisingly many computer science research projects, system outcomes may be influenced by computerized or human agents with different economic incentives. Such studies include P2P networks, routing protocols, agent systems, and attacker-defender security games. Even the most technical system raises a pressing economic question: what incentives will drive the success or failure of deployment? Traditional computer science techniques, in isolation, may overlook factors that are critical to the overall outcome: In these situations, human-subject experiments may form a useful complement, broadening our understanding through the formulation and testing of economically motivated hypotheses. I argue that these efforts can benefit from the large body of work that has been conducted in the field of experimental economics in the last 30 to 40 years. I discuss the methodology of experimental economics and review recent work that falls on the boundary of computer science and economics experiments and is likely unfamiliar to many professionals and researchers in technical fields.

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