论文信息 - Coalition formation in n-person stackelberg games

Coalition formation in n-person stackelberg games

Stackelberg games and their resulting nonconvex programming problems have been used to model multilevel economic systems. These formulations have suggested that independent players, acting sequentially, may not produce Pareto-optimal decisions. Such systems naturally encourage the introduction of an n-player abstract game which permits coalitions of players to form. This paper examines the mathematical characteristics of these imbedded games and the implications of their solution for the overall problem.

Wayne Bialas | Mark Chew

[1] T. Basar,et al. On the relative leadership property of Stackelberg strategies , 1973 .

[2] W. F. Lucas. Some Recent Developments in n-Person Game Theory , 1971 .

[3] Jonathan F. Bard,et al. An explicit solution to the multi-level programming problem , 1982, Comput. Oper. Res..

[4] P. P. Shenoy,et al. On coalition formation: a game-theoretical approach , 1979 .

[5] Wayne F. Bialas,et al. On two-level optimization , 1982 .

[6] Lloyd S. Shapley,et al. On balanced sets and cores , 1967 .

[7] Mark Karwan,et al. Multilevel optimization: A mathematical programming perspective , 1980, 1980 19th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control including the Symposium on Adaptive Processes.

[8] J. Cruz,et al. On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games , 1973 .

[9] W. Lucas,et al. N‐person games in partition function form , 1963 .