REVS – A ROBUST ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM

There are many protocols proposed for electronic voting, but only a few of them have prototypes implemented. Usually the prototypes are focused in the characteristics of the protocol and do not handle properly some real world issues, such as fault tolerance. This paper presents REVS, a robust electronic voting system designed for distributed and faulty environments, namely the Internet. The goal of REVS is to be an electronic voting system that accomplishes the desired characteristics of traditional voting systems, such as accuracy, democracy, privacy and verifiability. In addition, REVS deals with failures in real world scenarios, such as machine or communication failures, witch can lead to protocol interruptions. REVS robustness has consequences at three levels: (i) the voting process can be interrupted and recovered without weakening the voting protocol; (ii) it allows a certain degree of failures, with server replication; and (iii) none of the servers conducting the election, by its own or to a certain level of collusion, can corrupt the election outcome.

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