A Probabilistic Risk Mitigation Model for Cyber-Attacks to PMU Networks

The power grid is becoming more dependent on information and communication technologies. Complex networks of advanced sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) are used to collect real time data to improve the observability of the power system. Recent studies have shown that the power grid has significant cyber vulnerabilities which could increase when PMUs are used extensively. Therefore, recognizing and responding to vulnerabilities are critical to the security of the power grid. This paper proposes a risk mitigation model for optimal response to cyber-attacks to PMU networks. We model the optimal response action as a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem to prevent propagation of the cyber-attacks and maintain the observability of the power system.

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