Representations and Solutions for Game-Theoretic Problems

[1]  Leslie Pack Kaelbling,et al.  Planning and Acting in Partially Observable Stochastic Domains , 1998, Artif. Intell..

[2]  B. Stengel,et al.  Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies , 1996 .

[3]  H. Kuk On equilibrium points in bimatrix games , 1996 .

[4]  D. Koller,et al.  Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games , 1996 .

[5]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Computation of equilibria in finite games , 1996 .

[6]  B. Stengel,et al.  Eecient Computation of Behavior Strategies , 1996 .

[7]  A.J.J. Talman,et al.  Tracing equilibria in extensive games by complementary pivoting , 1996 .

[8]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge , 1995 .

[9]  S. Shenker Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines , 1994, SIGCOMM.

[10]  Bernhard von Stengel,et al.  Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees , 1994, STOC '94.

[11]  Matthew K. Franklin,et al.  Eavesdropping games: a graph-theoretic approach to privacy in distributed systems , 1993, Proceedings of 1993 IEEE 34th Annual Foundations of Computer Science.

[12]  Dana S. Nau,et al.  Strategic planning for imperfect-information games , 1993 .

[13]  J. Blair,et al.  Games with Imperfect Information , 1993 .

[14]  Steven A. Gordon A COMPARISON BETWEEN PROBABILISTIC SEARCH AND WEIGHTED HEURISTICS IN A GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION , 1993 .

[15]  D. Koller,et al.  The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form , 1992 .

[16]  Prashant Parikh,et al.  A Game-Theoretic Account of Implicature , 1992, TARK.

[17]  David N. L. Levy,et al.  Heuristic Programming in Artificial Intelligence , 1991, J. Int. Comput. Games Assoc..

[18]  Nimrod MegiddoyNovember The Complexity of Two-Person Zero-Sum Gamesin Extensive FormDaphne Koller , 1990 .

[19]  Ronald A. Howard,et al.  Readings on the Principles and Applications of Decision Analysis , 1989 .

[20]  E. Damme Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept , 1983 .

[21]  Nesa L'abbe Wu,et al.  Linear programming and extensions , 1981 .

[22]  Drew McDermott,et al.  Planning and Acting , 1978, Cogn. Sci..

[23]  H. Kunzi,et al.  Lectu re Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems , 1975 .

[24]  William F. Lucas,et al.  An Overview of the Mathematical Theory of Games , 1972 .

[25]  C. E. Lemke,et al.  Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming , 1965 .

[26]  C. E. Lemke,et al.  Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games , 1964 .

[27]  N. Vorob’ev Equilibrium Points in Bimatrix Games , 1958 .

[28]  H. W. Kuhn,et al.  11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information , 1953 .

[29]  Philip Wolfe,et al.  Contributions to the theory of games , 1953 .

[30]  E. Rowland Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , 1946, Nature.

[31]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. , 1945 .