The political economy of tax policy

From book synopsis: Tax by Design identifies what makes a good tax system for an open developed economy in the 21st century and suggests how the UK tax system could be reformed to move in that direction. The recommendations stress the importance of neutrality and transparency in tax design. It draws on the expert evidence from the commissioned chapters and commentaries in Dimensions of Tax Design. It also acknowledges the growing importance of globalised markets and multinational corporations as well as the challenges created by changing population demographics, the growth of new technologies, and the broadened objectives of policy makers.

[1]  Steffen Ganghof.  The Politics of Tax Structure , 2006 .

[2]  Werner Troesken.  Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches , 2008 .

[3]  R. Barro.  The control of politicians: An economic model , 1973 .

[4]  G. Tullock,et al.  The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy , 1962 .

[5]  M. Wallerstein,et al.  Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution , 2001, American Political Science Review.

[6]  A. Manning,et al.  Spend it like Beckham? Inequality and redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004 , 2012 .

[7]  John E. Roemer,et al.  Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb , 1998 .

[8]  Alberto Alesina,et al.  Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task , 2007 .

[9]  Edward L. Glaeser,et al.  Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe , 2004 .

[10]  James F. Wilson.  Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It , 1990 .

[11]  Luigi Orsenigo,et al.  Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: A European Perspective , 2000 .

[12]  P. Gould.  The Unfinished Revolution: How the Modernisers Saved the Labour Party , 1999 .

[13]  The Political Economy of Religion and Social Insurance in the United States, 1910–1939 , 2006, Studies in American Political Development.

[14]  T. Besley,et al.  Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence , 2006 .

[15]  Finn E. Kydland,et al.  Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans , 1977, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  A. Case,et al.  Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits , 1993 .

[17]  G. Duranton,et al.  Measuring the Cost Effectiveness of an R & D Tax Credit for the UK , 2001 .

[18]  Patrick Bolton,et al.  The Breakup of Nations: A Political Econ-omy Analysis , 1997 .

[19]  J. Snyder,et al.  Fairness, self-interest, and the politics of the progressive income tax , 1983 .

[20]  Stephen Coate,et al.  Issue Unbundling Via Citizens' Initiatives , 2000 .

[21]  D. Stasavage,et al.  Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance , 2006 .

[22]  John M. Carey.  The Economic Effects of Constitutions , 2005, Perspectives on Politics.

[23]  J. Ferejohn.  Incumbent performance and electoral control , 1986 .

[24]  D. Austen-Smith.  Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation , 2000, Journal of Political Economy.

[25]  Rachel Griffith,et al.  How Special is the Special Relationship? Using the Impact of Us R&D Spillovers on UK Firms as a Test of Technology Sourcing , 2004 .

[26]  Rachel Griffith,et al.  Background facts and comments on "Supporting growth in innovation: enhancing the R&D tax credit" , 2005 .

[27]  Allan H. Meltzer,et al.  A Rational Theory of the Size of Government , 1981, Journal of Political Economy.

[28]  D. Soskice,et al.  Electoral institutions, parties, and the politics of class: Why some democracies redistribute more than others , 2005 .

[29]  Roberto Perotti.  Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data say , 1996 .

[30]  J. Buchanan,et al.  The power to tax : analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution , 1981 .

[31]  M. Wallerstein,et al.  Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending: A Disaggregated Analysis , 2003 .

[32]  Voter ideology in Western Democracies, 1946– 1989 , 1998 .

[33]  Bronwyn H Hall.  R&D Tax Policy During the Eighties: Success or Failure? , 1992 .

[34]  W. Gale.  WHAT CAN AMERICA LEARN FROM THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM? , 1997, National Tax Journal.

[35]  D. Austen-Smith,et al.  Redistribution and affirmative action , 2006 .

[36]  David Dreyer Lassen,et al.  Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD Countries , 2003 .

[37]  A. S. Blinder,et al.  Is Government Too Political , 1997 .

[38]  R. Noll,et al.  The political economy of deregulation : interest groups in the regulatory process , 1983 .

[39]  M. Rothschild,et al.  Incumbent Behavior : Vote-Seeking , Tax-Setting , and Yardstick Competition , 2007 .

[40]  M. Paldam,et al.  The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years , 1994 .

[41]  J. Sachs,et al.  Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrialdemocracies , 1988 .

[42]  D. Butler,et al.  Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax , 1995 .

[43]  D. Foley.  Resource allocation and the public sector , 1967 .

[44]  Kevin Roberts,et al.  Voting over income tax schedules , 1977 .

[45]  L. Pavitt.  Death by a thousand cuts. , 2019, Nursing mirror.

[46]  Laura Abramovsky,et al.  University Research and the Location of Business R&D , 2007 .

[47]  T. L. Schwartz.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1986 .

[48]  Thomas Romer,et al.  Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax , 1975 .

[49]  John Van Reenen,et al.  Do R&D tax credits work? Evidence from a panel of countries 1979–1997 , 2002 .

[50]  S. Winer,et al.  Democratic Choice and Taxation , 1999 .