Fair Division with Subsidy

When allocating a set of goods to a set of agents, a classic fairness notion called envy-freeness requires that no agent prefer the allocation of another agent to her own. When the goods are indivisible, this notion is impossible to guarantee, and prior work has focused on its relaxations. However, envy-freeness can be achieved if a third party is willing to subsidize by providing a small amount of money (divisible good), which can be allocated along with the indivisible goods.

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