A Decision Support System for Choosing Market Mechanisms in e-Procurement

The variety of procurement mechanisms present in the today’s e-procurement landscape ranging from electronic catalogue systems over e-negotiations to e-auctions, points at the fact that there exists no single best solution for all sourcing activities. Each mechanism rather has certain advantages and disadvantages. From economic theory, especially from mechanism design theory, it is well known that even small changes in the design of exchange mechanisms can have considerable impact on the outcome. In this paper we address this issue and present a solution that is aimed at supporting mechanism designers in their decision making process on which mechanism to choose best in a specific situation. In particular we describe a knowledge based system that was designed to help procurement staff in choosing an optimal mechanism for a particular sourcing scenario.

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