Determinants of divisional performance evaluation practices

Abstract I investigate factors affecting firms' uses of three types of performance metrics to evaluate division mangers: division accounting metrics, firm accounting metrics and firm stock price. Survey data reveal that division accounting metric use increases with the divisions' industry's price–earnings correlation and decreases with divisional growth opportunities; firm accounting metric use increases with the manager's impact on other divisions and decreases with growth opportunities and other managers' impact on that division; and firm stock price use increases with relative division size and the correlation between firm stock returns and market-wide returns.

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