Obligations and Cooperation: Two Sides of Social Rationality

Even if, at first sight, deciding whether to respect obligations and coordinating cooperation seems two unrelated behaviors, they are both grounded in the social rationality of agents: in fact, they depend on the ability of predicting the actions of other agents. In this paper, we present a proposal for managing anticipatory coordination, which is used to regulate the autonomy of and to control agents in a definition of cooperation among agents and in a framework for dealing with obligations.

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