NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INFORMATION AND EMPLOYEE EVALUATION: EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

We thank seminar participants at Harvard University (Economics Department, Kennedy School, and School of Education), Columbia University (Business School and Teachers College), UC Davis, University of Oregon, London School of Economics, the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), and the University of Tel Aviv for many helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support was provided by the Fund for Public Schools. All opinions expressed herein represent those of the authors and not necessarily those of the New York City Department of Education. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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