Institutional Pressures and Voluntary Environmental Behavior in Developing Countries: Evidence From the Costa Rican Hotel Industry

This study aims to identify how institutional forces, such as regulatory and stakeholder pressures, are related to proactive environmental behavior by hotel facilities participating in Certification for Sustainable Tourism, a voluntary environmental program established by the Costa Rican government. This program is among the first third-party performance-based environmental certification initiatives implemented in the developing world. Findings suggest that voluntary environmental programs that include performance-based standards and third-party monitoring may be effective in promoting beyond-compliance environmental behavior when they are complemented by isomorphic institutional pressures exerted by government environmental monitoring and trade association membership. These results are consistent with neo-institutional theory from the organizational sociology literature. Surprisingly, findings also indicate that compared to locally owned hotels, foreign-owned and multinational subsidiary facilities do not seem to be significantly correlated with higher participation and superior environmental performance in Certification for Sustainable Tourism.

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