Multiattribute Call Markets

Multiattribute auctions support automated negotiation in settings where buyers and sellers have valuations for alternate configurations of a good, as defined by configuration attributes . Bidders express offers to buy or sell alternate configurations by specifying configuration-dependent reserve prices, and the auction determines both the traded goods and transaction prices based on these offers. While multiattribute auctions have been deployed in single-buyer procurement settings, the development of double-sided multiattribute auctions—allowing the free participation of both buyers and sellers—has received little attention from academia or industry. In this work I develop a multiattribute call market, a specific type of double auction in which bids accumulate over an extended period of time, before the auction determines trades based on the aggregate collection of bids. Building on a polynomial-time clearing algorithm, I contribute an efficient algorithm for information feedback. Supporting the implementation of market-based algorithms, information feedback support extends the range of settings for which multiattribute call markets achieve efficiency. Multiattribute auctions are only one of many auction variants introduced in recent years. The rapidly growing space of alternative auctions and trading scenarios calls for both a standardized language with which to specify auctions, as well as a computational test environment in which to evaluate alternate designs. I present a novel auction description language and deployment environment that supports the specification of a broad class of auctions, improving on prior approaches through a scripting language that employs both static parameter settings and rule-based behavior invocation. The market game platform, AB3D, can execute these auction scripts to implement multi-auction and multi-agent trading scenarios. The efficiency of multiattribute call markets depends crucially on the underlying valuations of participants. I analyze the expected performance limitations of multiattribute call markets, using existing analytical results where applicable. Addressing a lack of theoretical guidance in many natural settings, I introduce a computational metric on bidder valuations, and show a correlation between this metric and the expected efficiency of multiattribute call markets. As further validation, I integrate multiattribute markets into an existing supply chain simulation, demonstrating efficiency gains over a more conventional negotiation procedure.

[1]  Ravindra K. Ahuja,et al.  Network Flows: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications , 1993 .

[2]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computational criticisms of the revelation principle , 2004, EC '04.

[3]  Jason Shachat,et al.  Procurement Auctions for Differentiated Goods , 2009, Decis. Anal..

[4]  T. Sandholm,et al.  Costly valuation computation in auctions , 2001 .

[5]  Ilya Segal,et al.  The Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems , 2005 .

[6]  Daniel Lehmann,et al.  Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities , 2001, EC '01.

[7]  F. Branco The Design of Multidimensional Auctions , 1997 .

[8]  D. Lehmann,et al.  The Winner Determination Problem , 2003 .

[9]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[10]  Daniel M. Reeves Generating trading agent strategies , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.

[11]  Craig R. Carter,et al.  Deciding on the Mode of Negotiation: To Auction or Not to Auction Electronically , 2004 .

[12]  David Porter,et al.  Combinatorial auction design , 2003, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[13]  Amy Greenwald,et al.  Bid determination in simultaneous actions an agent architecture , 2001, EC '01.

[14]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[15]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders , 2005, STOC '05.

[16]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions , 2005, Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks.

[17]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Market-Based Resource Allocation for Information-Collection Scenarios , 2003, MAMUS.

[18]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed Implementation of General Equilibrium Outcomes , 1998 .

[19]  Bruno Strulovici,et al.  Concepts and Properties of Substitute Goods , 2006 .

[20]  N. Economides,et al.  Electronic Call Market Trading , 1995 .

[21]  David Levine,et al.  Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations , 2002, AAMAS '02.

[22]  Yeon-Koo Che Design competition through multidimensional auctions , 1993 .

[23]  V. Crawford,et al.  Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes , 1982 .

[24]  Ennio Stacchetti,et al.  The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[25]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments , 2004, AMEC.

[26]  Dave Cliff,et al.  Explorations in evolutionary design of online auction market mechanisms , 2003, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl..

[27]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Generalized value decomposition and structured multiattribute auctions , 2007, EC '07.

[28]  G. Tesauro,et al.  Analyzing Complex Strategic Interactions in Multi-Agent Systems , 2002 .

[29]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Trading Agents Competing: Performance, Progress, and Market Effectiveness , 2003, IEEE Intell. Syst..

[30]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[31]  R. Palmer,et al.  Characterizing effective trading strategies: Insights from a computerized double auction tournament , 1994 .

[32]  L. Hurwicz,et al.  ON THE STABILITY OF THE COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM, I1 , 1958 .

[33]  Jason Miller,et al.  Forecasting market prices in a supply chain game , 2007, AAMAS '07.

[34]  Ho Soo Lee,et al.  Computational Aspects of Clearing Continuous Call Double Auctions with Assignment Constraints and Indivisible Demand , 2001, Electron. Commer. Res..

[35]  Christoph Lattemann,et al.  Towards a Generic e-Market Design , 2002, I3E.

[36]  R. Myerson Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem , 1979 .

[37]  Steven R. Williams,et al.  Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency , 1989 .

[38]  Pablo Noriega,et al.  Competitive scenarios for heterogeneous trading agents , 1998, AGENTS '98.

[39]  Maria L. Gini,et al.  A Multi-Agent Negotiation Testbed for Contracting Tasks with Temporal and Precedence Constraints , 2002, Int. J. Electron. Commer..

[40]  Stefan Luckner,et al.  A Descriptive Auction Language , 2006, Electron. Mark..

[41]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding , 2002 .

[42]  Amy Greenwald,et al.  Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions , 2001, EC '01.

[43]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[44]  Brian W. Kernighan,et al.  AMPL: A Modeling Language for Mathematical Programming , 1993 .

[45]  Norman Sadeh,et al.  The Supply Chain Management Game for the Trading Agent Competition 2004 , 2004 .

[46]  Faruk Gul,et al.  WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH GROSS SUBSTITUTES , 1999 .

[47]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[48]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents , 1998, AGENTS '98.

[49]  John Rust,et al.  The Double Auction Market , 1989 .

[50]  Tuomas Sandholm eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server , 2002, Comput. Intell..

[51]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[52]  Jason Miller,et al.  Market Efficiency, Sales Competition, and the Bullwhip Effect in the TAC SCM Tournaments , 2006, TADA/AMEC.

[53]  Juho Mäkiö,et al.  Multi-attribute double auctions in financial trading , 2005, Seventh IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology (CEC'05).

[54]  Eugene Fink,et al.  Exchange Market for Complex Goods: Theory and Experiments , 2004 .

[55]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling , 2003, EC '03.

[56]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Automated Negotiation from Declarative Contract Descriptions , 2002, Comput. Intell..

[57]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation , 1998, Decis. Support Syst..

[58]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  A Classification Scheme for Negotiation in Electronic Commerce , 2001 .

[59]  P. Samuelson,et al.  Foundations of Economic Analysis. , 1948 .

[60]  Martin Bichler,et al.  Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions , 2005, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[61]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions , 2003, EC '03.

[62]  Norman M. Sadeh,et al.  The supply chain trading agent competition , 2005, Electron. Commer. Res. Appl..

[63]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[64]  M. Bichler The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms , 2001 .

[65]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Market‐Based Allocation with Indivisible Bids , 2009 .

[66]  M. Wellman,et al.  Automated Markets and Trading Agents , 2007 .

[67]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions , 2006, EC '06.

[68]  Michael H. Rothkopf,et al.  Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical , 2007, Oper. Res..

[69]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Empirical mechanism design: methods, with application to a supply-chain scenario , 2006, EC '06.

[70]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Approximate Strategic Reasoning through Hierarchical Reduction of Large Symmetric Games , 2005, AAAI.