论文信息 - Divisionalization in Contests - 字舞流文

Divisionalization in Contests

To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest.

Kai A. Konrad | Wieland Müller | Steffen Huck

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