论文信息 - Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants

Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants

This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetriccontestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. Oneof the N contestants is selected as the winner based onTullock's probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated.

William E. Stein | W. Stein

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