Long-term evolution of multilocus traits

We analyze monomorphic equilibria of long-term evolution for one or two continuous traits, controlled by an arbitrary number of autosomal loci and subject to constant viability selection. It turns out that fitness maximization always obtains at long term equilibria, but in the case of two traits, linkage determines the precise nature of the fitness measure that is maximized. We then consider local convergence to long term equilibria, for two multilocus traits subject to either constant or frequency dependent selection. From a model of long-term dynamics near an equilibrium we derive a criterion of local long-term stability for 2-dimensional equilibria. It turns out that mutation can be a decisive factor for stability.

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