The SERENITY Runtime Monitoring Framework

This chapter describes SERENITY’s approach to runtime monitoring and the framework that has been developed to support it. Runtime monitoring is required in SERENITY in order to check for violations of security and dependability properties which are necessary for the correct operation of the security and dependability solutions that are available from the SERENITY framework. This chapter discusses how such properties are specified and monitored. The chapter focuses on the activation and execution of monitoring activities using S&D Patterns and the actions that may be undertaken following the detection of property violations. The approach is demonstrated in reference to one of the industrial case studies of the SERENITY project.

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