论文信息 - An existence theorem for a bargaining set

An existence theorem for a bargaining set

Abstract This paper considers non-transferable utility games and provides sufficient conditions for the existence of the bargaining set introduced in Mas-Colell (1989). Our main assumption is weak balancedness. This assumption is weaker than balancedness and is satisfied in all transferable utility games and all three-player games. The proof of our main result is based on an application of a coincidence theorem of Fan (1969).

Rajiv Vohra | R. Vohra

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