Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle

Abstract In a finite game fix a space of extended probabilities over strategies and a profile of best response correspondences. A profile ofrationality orderingsis then given by an ordered partition of the set of strategies of each player, representing different degrees of rationality, where at-leastk+1-rational strategies are best responses against extended probabilities reflecting at leastkdegrees of rationality. This solution can be constructed inductively, providing a Bayesian foundation for controversial deletion procedures such as extensive form rationalizability and iterated weak dominance. Focusing on extensive games, this approach formalizes the best rationalization principle.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.

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