The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting

This paper studies the welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting by comparing the utilitarian efficiencies obtained in simulated voting under two behavioural assumptions: expected utility-maximising behaviour and sincere behaviour. Under approval voting utilitarian efficiency is relatively high irrespective of the behavioural assumption, and under the plurality rule strategic voting significantly increases utilitarian efficiency.

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