Ownership Risk, Investment, and the Use of Natural Resources

The effect of insecure ownership on ordinary investment and natural resource use is examined. Insecure ownership is postulated to depend on the type of government regime in power and the prevalence of political violence or instability. The political determinants of economy-wide investment are estimated from cross-country data, and the results are used to form an index of ownership security. When introduced into empirical models of natural resource use, this index has a significant and quantitatively important effect on the use of forests and petroleum. Contrary to conventional wisdom, ownership risk slows resource use in some circumstances.

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