Improving Privacy in Cryptographic Elections

This report describes two simple extensions to the paper A Robust and Veriiable Cryptographically Secure Election Scheme presented in the 1985 Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science. The rst extension allows the \government" to be divided into an arbitrary number of \tellers". With this extension, trust in any one teller is suucient to assure privacy, even if the remaining tellers conspire in an attempt to breach privacy. The second extension allows a government to reveal (and convince voters of) the winner in an election without releasing the actual tally. Combining these two extensions in a uniform manner remains an open problem.

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