How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?

Understanding the likelihood for an election to be tied is a classical topic in many disciplines including social choice, game theory, political science, and public choice. The problem is important not only as a fundamental problem in probability theory and statistics, but also because of its critical roles in many other important issues such as indecisiveness of voting, strategic voting, privacy of voting, voting power, voter turn out, etc. Despite a large body of literature and the common belief that ties are rare, little is known about how rare ties are in large elections except for a few simple positional scoring rules under the i.i.d. uniform distribution over the votes, known as the Impartial Culture (IC) in social choice. In particular, little progress was made after Marchant [Mar01] explicitly posed the likelihood of k-way ties under IC as an open question in 2001. We give an asymptotic answer to the open question for a wide range of commonly-studied voting rules under a model that is much more general and realistic than i.i.d. models including IC--the smoothed social choice framework [Xia20], which was inspired by the celebrated smoothed complexity analysis [ST09]. We prove dichotomy theorems on the smoothed likelihood of ties under a large class of voting rules. Our main technical tool is an improved dichotomous characterization on the smoothed likelihood for a Poisson multinomial variable to be in a polyhedron, which is proved by exploring the interplay between the V-representation and the matrix representation of polyhedra and might be of independent interest.

[1]  Lirong Xia The Smoothed Possibility of Social Choice , 2020, NeurIPS.

[2]  H. Margolis Probability of a tie election , 1977 .

[3]  Noam Nisan,et al.  A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives , 2011, SIAM J. Comput..

[4]  Svetlana Obraztsova,et al.  On manipulation in multi-winner elections based on scoring rules , 2013, AAMAS.

[5]  Hegel on the calculus of voting , 1974 .

[6]  Lirong Xia,et al.  Generalized Decision Scoring Rules: Statistical, Computational, and Axiomatic Properties , 2015, EC.

[7]  Shang-Hua Teng,et al.  Smoothed analysis: an attempt to explain the behavior of algorithms in practice , 2009, CACM.

[8]  I. J. Good,et al.  Estimating the efficacy of a vote , 1975 .

[9]  Toby Walsh,et al.  Ties Matter: Complexity of Manipulation when Tie-Breaking with a Random Vote , 2013, AAAI.

[10]  A. Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy , 1957 .

[11]  Banzhaf,et al.  One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College , 1968 .

[12]  Gary Chamberlain,et al.  A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote , 1981 .

[13]  Svetlana Obraztsova,et al.  On the Complexity of Voting Manipulation under Randomized Tie-Breaking , 2011, IJCAI.

[14]  Nicolas de Condorcet Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite Des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite Des Voix , 2009 .

[15]  David C. Mcgarvey A THEOREMI ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF VOTING PARADOXES , 1953 .

[16]  J. Banks,et al.  Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem , 1996, American Political Science Review.

[17]  A. Gibbard Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[18]  Svetlana Obraztsova,et al.  Ties Matter: Complexity of Voting Manipulation Revisited , 2011, IJCAI.

[19]  Markus Schulze,et al.  A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method , 2011, Soc. Choice Welf..

[20]  William J. Cook,et al.  Sensitivity theorems in integer linear programming , 1986, Math. Program..

[21]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  General Tiebreaking Schemes for Computational Social Choice , 2015, AAMAS.

[22]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Large Poisson Games , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[23]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Finite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules , 2009, IJCAI.

[24]  Jane Zundel MATCHING THEORY , 2011 .

[25]  Gary King,et al.  Estimating the Probability of Events that Have Never Occured: When is Your Vote Decisive? , 1998 .

[26]  W. Hoeffding Probability Inequalities for sums of Bounded Random Variables , 1963 .

[27]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections , 2007, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[28]  Jun Wang,et al.  Practical Algorithms for STV and Ranked Pairs with Parallel Universes Tiebreaking , 2018, ArXiv.

[29]  M. Satterthwaite Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .

[30]  Nathaniel N. Beck A note on the probability of a tied election , 1975 .

[31]  Lirong Xia,et al.  On a generalization of triangulated graphs for domains decomposition of CSPs , 2009, IJCAI.

[32]  Lirong Xia,et al.  Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules , 2012, EC '12.

[33]  Martin Raivc,et al.  A multivariate Berry–Esseen theorem with explicit constants , 2018, Bernoulli.

[34]  Toby Walsh,et al.  How Hard Is It to Control an Election by Breaking Ties? , 2013, ECAI.

[35]  Robert Sugden,et al.  Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory , 1994 .

[36]  Dorothea Baumeister,et al.  Towards Reality: Smoothed Analysis in Computational Social Choice , 2020, AAMAS.

[37]  J. Darroch On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials , 1964 .

[38]  Elchanan Mossel,et al.  A quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality , 2015, Comb..

[39]  C. Domb,et al.  On the theory of cooperative phenomena in crystals , 1960 .

[40]  Elchanan Mossel,et al.  A Smooth Transition from Powerlessness to Absolute Power , 2012, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[41]  Raphael Gillett The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures , 1980 .

[42]  Carl D. Meyer,et al.  Matrix Analysis and Applied Linear Algebra , 2000 .

[43]  Kirk Pruhs,et al.  The Price of Stochastic Anarchy , 2008, SAGT.

[44]  Gregory Valiant,et al.  Estimating the unseen: an n/log(n)-sample estimator for entropy and support size, shown optimal via new CLTs , 2011, STOC '11.

[45]  T. Feddersen,et al.  The Swing Voter's Curse , 1996 .

[46]  Daniel M. Kane,et al.  The fourier transform of poisson multinomial distributions and its algorithmic applications , 2015, STOC.

[47]  Shang-Hua Teng,et al.  On the Approximation and Smoothed Complexity of Leontief Market Equilibria , 2006, FAW.

[48]  W. Riker,et al.  A Theory of the Calculus of Voting , 1968, American Political Science Review.

[49]  Felix A. Fischer,et al.  The Price of Neutrality for the Ranked Pairs Method , 2012, AAAI.

[50]  Andrew Gelman,et al.  What is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference? , 2009 .

[51]  Ronald L. Rivest,et al.  Computing the Margin of Victory in IRV Elections , 2011, EVT/WOTE.

[52]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Barriers to Manipulation in Voting , 2016, Handbook of Computational Social Choice.

[53]  Thierry Marchant The probability of ties with scoring methods: Some results , 2001, Soc. Choice Welf..

[54]  Political entrepreneurship: Jefferson, Bayard, and the election of 1800 , 2015 .

[55]  Jaakko Kuorikoski,et al.  Unrealistic Assumptions in Rational Choice Theory , 2007 .

[56]  P. Faliszewski,et al.  Control and Bribery in Voting , 2016, Handbook of Computational Social Choice.

[57]  Alexander Schrijver,et al.  Theory of linear and integer programming , 1986, Wiley-Interscience series in discrete mathematics and optimization.

[58]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability , 2008, EC '08.

[59]  Dominique Lepelley,et al.  Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule , 2016 .

[60]  Ariel D. Procaccia,et al.  Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[61]  M. Pivato,et al.  Truth-Revealing Voting Rules for Large Populations , 2016 .

[62]  T. Tideman,et al.  Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules , 1987 .