Negative-based prominence: the role of negative features in matching and choice

Previous research related to the prominence effect (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) has mainly focused on the causes and boundary conditions of the effect. This article investigates the determinants of prominence and explores a negative-based prominence effect in which the negative attribute becomes the prominent one. Using a matching-choice procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 show that the negative dimension became the prominent one under two different cover stories, suggesting that the negative feature looms larger in choice than in matching. The robustness of negative-based prominence was further demonstrated in a direct choice task without matching (Experiment 3) and was shown to be resistant to the impact of added positive features (Experiment 4). Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 distinguish between two determinants of prominence: intrinsic prominence caused by attribute importance and negative-based prominence caused by negative attribute values. By lowering the values on the positive dimension and enhancing the values on the negative dimension, one can reverse the prominence effect. The results suggest that, compared to a matching task, choice leads to enhanced sensitivity to negative features. The relations between negative characteristics of an attribute and other factors that determine prominence are discussed in the final section.

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