Stop chasing the AI illusion

ion while holding that all we can know are particulars. Returning to Naur’s criticism of philosophy, science, and scholarship, I also presume to offer a correction: Instead of saying “the influence of philosophy on science and scholarship is confusion,” one should say the influence of disordered philosophy on science and scholarship is confusion. Naur distinguished description from investigation of cause, limiting himself to the former, which is crucial for avoiding confusion. Consider the following experiment: I hold a pencil above a table then drop it. The physicist records and analyzes (describes after the fact) what happened, developing theories of motion and gravity that allow us to predict (describe in advance) what will happen when we repeat the experiment. We then test the theories. Confirmed theories allow us to predict reliably and precisely what will happen in similar cases. We have discovered the “what” and the “how” (description) but not the “why” (cause). Forgetting this distinction, when someone asks why the pencil falls to the table, we mistakenly answer “gravity.” In the realm of description (physical science) the experiment is a demonstration and confirmation (proof) of the theories of motion and gravity. But in the realm of causes it is a proof for the existence of God. Meanwhile, Naur’s assessment of the state of psychotherapy in the “American psychology enterprise” seemed charitable to me. Taking an empirical perspective, he compared it to the state of general medicine in 1800 but passed over two centuries worth of change for the worse in motive and worldview. Naur also aimed Stop Chasing the AI Illusion