Counterfactual scorekeeping

Orthodoxy has it that counterfactuals cannot be treated as strict conditionals. But there is a loophole: if the strictness is a function of context then maybe they can be so treated. I argue for a loophole analysis that treats ‘would’-counterfactuals as strict conditionals that are duals to ‘might’- counterfactuals. Most of the work lies in getting straight about the interaction between context and semantic value. I treat it as a general feature of the dynamics of conversational score.

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