Multiagent Systems - Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

[1]  L. Brouwer.  Über Abbildung von Mannigfaltigkeiten , 1911 .

[2]  A. C. Pigou.  Economics of welfare , 1920 .

[3]  J. Neumann.  Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele , 1928 .

[4]  E. Sperner.  Neuer beweis für die invarianz der dimensionszahl und des gebietes , 1928 .

[5]  C. Hartshorne,et al.  Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 1935, Nature.

[6]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. , 1945 .

[7]  J. Nash.  Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. , 1950, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[8]  J. Robinson.  AN ITERATIVE METHOD OF SOLVING A GAME , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.

[9]  J. Nash.  NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.

[10]  J. G. Wardrop,et al.  Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research , 1952 .

[11]  L. Shapley,et al.  Stochastic Games* , 1953, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[12]  H. W. Kuhn,et al.  11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information , 1953 .

[13]  L. J. Savage,et al.  The Foundations of Statistics , 1955 .

[14]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games And Decisions , 1958 .

[15]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  GAMES AND DECISIONS; INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY. , 1958 .

[16]  H. Raiffa,et al.  Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. , 1958 .

[17]  T. Schelling.  The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[18]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[19]  L. Shapley,et al.  College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage , 1962 .

[20]  J. Hintikka.  Knowledge and belief , 1962 .

[21]  Herbert E. Scarf,et al.  The Approximation of Fixed Points of a Continuous Mapping , 1967 .

[22]  R. Cassady.  Auctions and Auctioneering , 2023 .

[23]  J. Harsanyi.  Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game , 1968 .

[24]  Dietrich Braess,et al.  Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung , 1968, Unternehmensforschung.

[25]  H. Grice.  Utterer's meaning and intentions , 1969 .

[26]  S. Vajda.  Some topics in two-person games , 1971 .

[27]  E. H. Clarke.  Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[28]  J. H. Smith.  AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES WITH VARIABLE ELECTORATE , 1973 .

[29]  D. Schmeidler.  Equilibrium points of nonatomic games , 1973 .

[30]  J. M. Smith,et al.  The Logic of Animal Conflict , 1973, Nature.

[31]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[32]  A. Gibbard.  Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[33]  R. Rosenthal.  A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria , 1973 .

[34]  M. Spence.  Job Market Signaling , 1973 .

[35]  R. Aumann.  Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies , 1974 .

[36]  L. Shapley.  A note on the Lemke-Howson algorithm , 1974 .

[37]  M. Satterthwaite.  Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .

[38]  R. Selten.  Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.

[39]  J M Smith,et al.  Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[40]  Eitan Muller,et al.  The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness , 1977 .

[41]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods , 1977 .

[42]  L. Hurwicz.  Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes , 1977 .

[43]  L. Hurwicz.  On informationally decentralized systems , 1977 .

[44]  R. Myerson.  Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept , 1978 .

[45]  C. E. Lemke.  Some pivot schemes for the linear complementarity problem , 1978 .

[46]  P. Taylor,et al.  Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics , 1978 .

[47]  C. d'Aspremont,et al.  Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .

[48]  J. Searle.  Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts , 1979 .

[49]  K. Arrow.  The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Incomplete Information**This work was supported by National Science Foundation under Grant No. SOC75-21820 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University. , 1979 .

[50]  R. Myerson.  Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem , 1979 .

[51]  Brian F. Chellas.  Modal Logic: Normal systems of modal logic , 1980 .

[52]  Reid G. Smith,et al.  The Contract Net Protocol: High-Level Communication and Control in a Distributed Problem Solver , 1980, IEEE Transactions on Computers.

[53]  A. Feldman.  Welfare economics and social choice theory , 1980 .

[54]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[55]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding , 1981 .

[56]  David A. Freedman,et al.  Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm , 1981 .

[57]  R. Rosenthal.  Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox , 1981 .

[58]  R. Myerson.  Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems , 1982 .

[59]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .

[60]  David E. Bell,et al.  Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty , 1982, Oper. Res..

[61]  R. Sugden,et al.  Regret Theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty Review of Economic Studies , 1982 .

[62]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[63]  R. Kellogg,et al.  Pathways to solutions, fixed points, and equilibria , 1983 .

[64]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[65]  Randall Davis,et al.  Negotiation as a Metaphor for Distributed Problem Solving , 1988, Artif. Intell..

[66]  C. Pollard,et al.  Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2022 .

[67]  B. Peleg,et al.  Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games , 1983 .

[68]  Joseph Y. Halpern,et al.  Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment , 1984, JACM.

[69]  Robert C. Moore.  A Formal Theory of Knowledge and Action , 1984 .

[70]  R. Myerson.  MULTISTAGE GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION , 1984 .

[71]  A. Roth.  The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory , 1984, Journal of Political Economy.

[72]  David Pearce.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .

[73]  Kim C. Border,et al.  Fixed point theorems with applications to economics and game theory: References , 1985 .

[74]  A. Neyman.  Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1985 .

[75]  Terry Winograd,et al.  Understanding computers and cognition - a new foundation for design , 1987 .

[76]  J. Mertens,et al.  ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA , 1986 .

[77]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .

[78]  D. Graham,et al.  Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions , 1987, Journal of Political Economy.

[79]  Joseph Farrell.  Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry , 1987 .

[80]  Michael E. Bratman,et al.  Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason , 1991 .

[81]  Matthew L. Ginsberg,et al.  Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning , 1987, AAAI 1987.

[82]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders , 1987 .

[83]  Brad Hartfield,et al.  Computer systems and the design of organizational interaction , 1988, TOIS.

[84]  David M. Kreps.  Notes On The Theory Of Choice , 1988 .

[85]  P G rdenfors,et al.  Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states , 1988 .

[86]  I. Gilboa.  The Complexity of Computing Best-Response Automata in Repeated Games , 1988 .

[87]  C. Watkins.  Learning from delayed rewards , 1989 .

[88]  D. Over,et al.  Studies in the Way of Words. , 1989 .

[89]  Eitan Zemel,et al.  Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations , 1989 .

[90]  M. Rabin.  Communication between Rational Agents , 1990 .

[91]  Allen A. Goldstein.  A Global Newton Method , 1990, Applied Geometry And Discrete Mathematics.

[92]  Richard E. Korf,et al.  Real-Time Heuristic Search , 1990, Artif. Intell..

[93]  John Nachbar.  “Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties , 1990 .

[94]  Hector J. Levesque,et al.  Intention is Choice with Commitment , 1990, Artif. Intell..

[95]  Alvin E. Roth,et al.  Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .

[96]  Ronald M. Harstad,et al.  Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders , 1990 .

[97]  Elchanan Ben-Porath.  The complexity of computing a best response automaton in repeated games with mixed strategies , 1990 .

[98]  Hirofumi Katsuno,et al.  On the Difference between Updating a Knowledge Base and Revising It , 1991, KR.

[99]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  On Total Functions, Existence Theorems and Computational Complexity , 1991, Theor. Comput. Sci..

[100]  Anand S. Rao,et al.  Modeling Rational Agents within a BDI-Architecture , 1997, KR.

[101]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .

[102]  C. Papadimitriou.  On platers with a bounded number of states , 1992 .

[103]  Munindar P. Singh.  A Critical Examination of Use Cohen-Levesque Theory of Intentions , 1992, ECAI.

[104]  D. Koller,et al.  The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form , 1992 .

[105]  Craig Boutilier.  Conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revision , 1992 .

[106]  Yoav Shoham.  Agent-Oriented Programming , 1993, Artif. Intell..

[107]  Michael P. Wellman.  A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems , 1993, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[108]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations , 1993, AAAI.

[109]  Eitan Zemel,et al.  The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies , 1993, Math. Oper. Res..

[110]  Joseph Farrell.  Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games , 1993 .

[111]  E. Kalai,et al.  Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .

[112]  Mihalis Yannakakis,et al.  On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract) , 1994, STOC '94.

[113]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Weak-Commitment Search for Solving Constraint Satisfaction Problems , 1994, AAAI.

[114]  Xiaotie Deng,et al.  On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts , 1994, Math. Oper. Res..

[115]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge and probability , 1988, JACM.

[116]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  On the Complexity of the Parity Argument and Other Inefficient Proofs of Existence , 1994, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[117]  Michael L. Littman,et al.  Markov Games as a Framework for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning , 1994, ICML.

[118]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Knowledge, Certainty, Belief, and Conditionalisation (Abbreviated Version) , 1994, KR.

[119]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[120]  Timothy W. Finin,et al.  KQML as an agent communication language , 1994, CIKM '94.

[121]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  On Social Laws for Artificial Agent Societies: Off-Line Design , 1995, Artif. Intell..

[122]  R. Aumann.  Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality , 1995 .

[123]  Peter Norvig,et al.  Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach , 1995 .

[124]  Joseph Farrell.  Talk Is Cheap , 1995 .

[125]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play , 1995 .

[126]  Avi Pfeffer,et al.  Generating and Solving Imperfect Information Games , 1995, IJCAI.

[127]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge , 1995 .

[128]  Chung Hee Hwang,et al.  The TRAINS project: a case study in building a conversational planning agent , 1994, J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell..

[129]  Andrew W. Moore,et al.  Reinforcement Learning: A Survey , 1996, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[130]  D. Koller,et al.  Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games , 1996 .

[131]  J. Herskowitz,et al.  Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA , 1996, Current Biology.

[132]  Jeremy I. Bulow,et al.  Auctions versus Negotiations , 1996 .

[133]  L. Shapley,et al.  Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests , 1996 .

[134]  B. Stengel,et al.  Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies , 1996 .

[135]  Csaba Szepesvári,et al.  A Generalized Reinforcement-Learning Model: Convergence and Applications , 1996, ICML.

[136]  E. Kohlberg,et al.  Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium , 1996 .

[137]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Computation of equilibria in finite games , 1996 .

[138]  B. Stengel,et al.  COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PERSON GAMES , 1996 .

[139]  Robert J. Aumann,et al.  Reply to Binmore , 1996 .

[140]  K. Binmore.  A note on backward induction , 1996 .

[141]  John Nachbar,et al.  Non-computable strategies and discounted repeated games , 1996 .

[142]  Johan van Benthem,et al.  Exploring logical dynamics , 1996, Studies in logic, language and information.

[143]  J. Filar,et al.  Competitive Markov Decision Processes , 1996 .

[144]  H. Kuk.  On equilibrium points in bimatrix games , 1996 .

[145]  Vijay Krishna,et al.  Efficient Mechanism Design , 1998 .

[146]  S. Hart,et al.  A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium , 2000 .

[147]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  On the Emergence of Social Conventions: Modeling, Analysis, and Simulations , 1997, Artif. Intell..

[148]  Ilya Segal,et al.  Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green , 1997 .

[149]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  Applications of a logic of knowledge to motion planning under uncertainty , 1997, JACM.

[150]  Grigoris Antoniou,et al.  Nonmonotonic reasoning , 1997 .

[151]  A. Rubinstein.  Modeling Bounded Rationality , 1998 .

[152]  Richard J. Doyle.  The Emergence of S , 1997 .

[153]  Frank Kelly,et al.  Charging and rate control for elastic traffic , 1997, Eur. Trans. Telecommun..

[154]  Randy Goebel,et al.  Computational intelligence - a logical approach , 1998 .

[155]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  On the Knowledge Requirements of Tasks , 1998, Artif. Intell..

[156]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  The Dynamics of Reinforcement Learning in Cooperative Multiagent Systems , 1998, AAAI/IAAI.

[157]  K. Binmore.  Backward Induction and Common Knowledge , 1998 .

[158]  Anand S. Rao,et al.  Decision Procedures for BDI Logics , 1998, J. Log. Comput..

[159]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm , 1998, ICML.

[160]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .

[161]  Richard L. Mendelsohn,et al.  First-Order Modal Logic , 1998 .

[162]  M. KleinbergJon.  Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment , 1999 .

[163]  Kathryn B. Laskey,et al.  Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 15 , 1999 .

[164]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Conditional Universal Consistency , 1999 .

[165]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Worst-case equilibria , 1999 .

[166]  John-Jules Ch. Meyer,et al.  A Logical Approach to the Dynamics of Commitments , 1999, Artif. Intell..

[167]  P. Klemperer.  Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature , 1999 .

[168]  Anja De Waegenaere,et al.  Cooperative games with stochastic payoffs , 1999, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[169]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions , 2002, EC '99.

[170]  Steven R. Williams.  A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms , 1999 .

[171]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches , 1999, IJCAI.

[172]  Rajeev Motwani,et al.  The PageRank Citation Ranking : Bringing Order to the Web , 1999, WWW 1999.

[173]  Dean P. Foster,et al.  Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem , 1999 .

[174]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions , 1999, IJCAI.

[175]  Daniel Lehmann,et al.  Representing and Aggregating Conflicting Beliefs , 2000, KR.

[176]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II , 2000 .

[177]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Reasoning about rational agents , 2000, Intelligent robots and autonomous agents.

[178]  Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders , 2000 .

[179]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[180]  Gerhard Weiss.  Search Algorithms for Agents , 2000 .

[181]  Pierfrancesco La Mura.  Game Networks , 2000, UAI.

[182]  Ariel Rubinstein.  Economics and language : five essays , 2000 .

[183]  P. Klemperer.  The Economic Theory of Auctions , 2000 .

[184]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Distributed Constraint Satisfaction: Foundations of Cooperation in Multi-agent Systems , 2000 .

[185]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Belief Fusion: Aggregating Pedigreed Belief States , 2001, J. Log. Lang. Inf..

[186]  Manuela M. Veloso,et al.  Rational and Convergent Learning in Stochastic Games , 2001, IJCAI.

[187]  M. de Rijke,et al.  Modal Logic , 2001, Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science.

[188]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.

[189]  Michael L. Littman,et al.  Graphical Models for Game Theory , 2001, UAI.

[190]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[191]  Prashant Parikh.  The use of language , 2001 .

[192]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[193]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency , 2001 .

[194]  Michael L. Littman,et al.  Friend-or-Foe Q-learning in General-Sum Games , 2001, ICML.

[195]  J. Geanakoplos.  Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem , 2001 .

[196]  Daphne Koller,et al.  Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams for Representing and Solving Games , 2001, IJCAI.

[197]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions , 2001, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[198]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2001, AAMAS '02.

[199]  Éva Tardos,et al.  Frugal path mechanisms , 2002, SODA '02.

[200]  Marc Pauly,et al.  A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games , 2002, J. Log. Comput..

[201]  Tuomas Sandholm.  Contract Types for Satisficing Task Allocation:I Theoretical Results , 2002 .

[202]  Rakesh V. Vohra,et al.  Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games , 2002, Int. J. Game Theory.

[203]  Ronen I. Brafman,et al.  R-MAX - A General Polynomial Time Algorithm for Near-Optimal Reinforcement Learning , 2001, J. Mach. Learn. Res..

[204]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2002, EC '01.

[205]  Robin Hanson,et al.  Combinatorial Information Market Design , 2003, Inf. Syst. Frontiers.

[206]  Joseph Y. Halpern.  Reasoning about uncertainty , 2003 .

[207]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Towards a Logic of Rational Agency , 2003, Log. J. IGPL.

[208]  D. Koller,et al.  Planning under uncertainty in complex structured environments , 2003 .

[209]  Daphne Koller,et al.  A Continuation Method for Nash Equilibria in Structured Games , 2003, IJCAI.

[210]  Robert Wilson,et al.  A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria , 2003, J. Econ. Theory.

[211]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing , 2002, FSTTCS.

[212]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Distributed algorithmic mechanism design , 2003 .

[213]  Martin Spann,et al.  Internet-Based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting , 2003, Manag. Sci..

[214]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core , 2003, EC '03.

[215]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria , 2002, IJCAI.

[216]  D. Lehmann,et al.  The Winner Determination Problem , 2003 .

[217]  Sylvain Sorin,et al.  Stochastic Games and Applications , 2003 .

[218]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Algorithms for Distributed Constraint Satisfaction: A Review , 2000, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.

[219]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  New Criteria and a New Algorithm for Learning in Multi-Agent Systems , 2004, NIPS.

[220]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains , 2004, AAAI.

[221]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[222]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  The complexity of pure Nash equilibria , 2004, STOC '04.

[223]  Peter Dayan,et al.  Technical Note: Q-Learning , 2004, Machine Learning.

[224]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Using Contracts to Influence the Outcome of a Game , 2004, AAAI.

[225]  Nikos A. Vlassis,et al.  Anytime algorithms for multiagent decision making using coordination graphs , 2004, 2004 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics (IEEE Cat. No.04CH37583).

[226]  K-Implementation , 2011, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[227]  Bernhard von Stengel,et al.  Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game , 2004, 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.

[228]  Kenneth Steiglitz,et al.  Frugality in path auctions , 2004, SODA '04.

[229]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Bayesian reinforcement learning for coalition formation under uncertainty , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[230]  H. Peyton Young,et al.  Strategic Learning and Its Limits , 2004 .

[231]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for Games with Strict Type Uncertainty , 2004, UAI.

[232]  Michael Kearns,et al.  Near-Optimal Reinforcement Learning in Polynomial Time , 2002, Machine Learning.

[233]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Run the GAMUT: a comprehensive approach to evaluating game-theoretic algorithms , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[234]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Fair imposition , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.

[235]  David M. Pennock.  A dynamic pari-mutuel market for hedging, wagering, and information aggregation , 2004, EC '04.

[236]  Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games , 2005, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[237]  José R. Correa,et al.  On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games , 2005, IPCO.

[238]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games , 2005, EC '05.

[239]  Allan Borodin,et al.  Link analysis ranking: algorithms, theory, and experiments , 2005, TOIT.

[240]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Optimal Winner Determination Algorithms , 2005 .

[241]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions , 2005, Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks.

[242]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Ranking systems: the PageRank axioms , 2005, EC '05.

[243]  Tim Roughgarden,et al.  Selfish routing and the price of anarchy , 2005 .

[244]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of (iterated) dominance , 2005, EC '05.

[245]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games , 2005, STOC '05.

[246]  Srihari Govindan,et al.  Essential equilibria , 2005, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[247]  Robert Wilson,et al.  Refinements of Nash Equilibrium , 2005 .

[248]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Learning against opponents with bounded memory , 2005, IJCAI.

[249]  John N. Tsitsiklis,et al.  Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.

[250]  Ilya Segal,et al.  The Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems , 2005 .

[251]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  Ascending Proxy Auctions , 2005 .

[252]  Makoto Yokoo.  Pseudonymous Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions , 2005 .

[253]  Constantinos Daskalakis,et al.  Computing Pure Nash Equilibria via Markov Random Fields , 2005, ArXiv.

[254]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Learning against multiple opponents , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[255]  Ruggiero Cavallo,et al.  Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments , 2006, AAMAS '06.

[256]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  The Game World Is Flat: The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Succinct Games , 2006, ICALP.

[257]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions , 2006 .

[258]  Xiaotie Deng,et al.  Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium , 2006, 2006 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'06).

[259]  Andreas S. Schulz,et al.  ON THE INEFFICIENCY OF EQUILIBRIA IN NONATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES , 2006 .

[260]  Paul W. Goldberg,et al.  The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium , 2006, STOC '06.

[261]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Strong mediated equilibrium , 2006, Artif. Intell..

[262]  John N. Tsitsiklis,et al.  Communication Requirements of VCG-Like Mechanisms in Convex Environments , 2006 .

[263]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Multi-attribute coalitional games , 2006, EC '06.

[264]  Paul W. Goldberg,et al.  Reducibility among equilibrium problems , 2006, STOC '06.

[265]  E. Maasland,et al.  Auction Theory , 2021, Springer Texts in Business and Economics.

[266]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Computational aspects of preference aggregation , 2006 .

[267]  Éric Grégoire,et al.  Logic-based approaches to information fusion , 2006, Inf. Fusion.

[268]  Boi Faltings,et al.  Distributed Constraint Programming , 2006, Handbook of Constraint Programming.

[269]  Kevin Leyton-Brown,et al.  A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Action Graph Games , 2006, AAAI.

[270]  W. Gaertner.  A Primer in Social Choice Theory , 2006 .

[271]  Michael L. Littman,et al.  An Efficient Optimal-Equilibrium Algorithm for Two-player Game Trees , 2006, UAI.

[272]  Andrew McLennan,et al.  Gambit: Software Tools for Game Theory , 2006 .

[273]  Rudolf Müller,et al.  Tractable cases of the winner determination problem , 2006 .

[274]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments , 2007, EC '07.

[275]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question? , 2007, Artif. Intell..

[276]  Michael Wooldridge,et al.  Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games , 2007, AAAI.

[277]  R. Vohra,et al.  Algorithmic Game Theory: Mechanism Design without Money , 2007 .

[278]  Wiebe van der Hoek,et al.  Modal logic for games and information , 2007, Handbook of Modal Logic.

[279]  Torben Braüner,et al.  First-order modal logic , 2007, Handbook of Modal Logic.

[280]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Foundations of multi-agent learning: Introduction to the special issue , 2007, Artif. Intell..

[281]  Eduardo L. Fermé,et al.  Belief Revision , 2007, Inteligencia Artif..

[282]  R. Johari.  Algorithmic Game Theory: The Price of Anarchy and the Design of Scalable Resource Allocation Mechanisms , 2007 .

[283]  N. Nisan.  Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) , 2007 .

[284]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms , 2000, EC '00.

[285]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[286]  Kevin Leyton-Brown,et al.  Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions , 2007, SECO.

[287]  Robert B. Wilson.  Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information , 2007 .

[288]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Bayesian Coalitional Games , 2008, AAAI.

[289]  Peter Gärdenfors,et al.  Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States , 2008 .

[290]  Ron Lavi,et al.  Algorithmic Mechanism Design , 2008, Encyclopedia of Algorithms.

[291]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[292]  Paul Milgrom,et al.  Core-selecting package auctions , 2008, Int. J. Game Theory.

[293]  Thomas A. Rietz,et al.  Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research , 2008 .

[294]  Aravind Srinivasan,et al.  On random sampling auctions for digital goods , 2009, EC '09.

[295]  N. Schofield.  Social choice , 2020, Game Theory.

[296]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  An axiomatic approach to personalized ranking systems , 2007, JACM.

[297]  J. Walrand,et al.  Distributed Dynamic Programming , 2022 .