Resilient PMU Network Design in the Face of GPS Spoofing Attacks

GPS spoofing attack on a PMU network and its impact on synchrophasor availability (SA) are investigated. SA is defined as the fraction of time on average the time–synchronized phasors of a bus are correctly available for close to real–time applications such as control or monitoring. It is explored how different factors and strategies, such as attack holding time, coordinated attacks, or capabilities of detecting correct data, can affect the SA. In addition, a PMU placement problem is formulated and solved for establishing a new attack–tolerant PMU network or upgrading an existing PMU network using the concept of bus–centric synchrophasor availability (SA) assessment. The established PMU network is required to satisfy a specified SA requirement for each bus in the face of GPS spoofing attacks and communication interruptions. If it is feasible, the newly designed PMU network guarantees the required average performance level of the PMU network. The IEEE 68–bus system is used as a case study to show the effectiveness of the attack–tolerant PMU placement.