Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.

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