Liquid Welfare Maximization in Auctions with Multiple Items

Liquid welfare is an alternative efficiency measure for auctions with budget constrained agents. Previous studies focused on auctions of a single (type of) good. In this paper, we initiate the study of general multi-item auctions, obtaining a truthful budget feasible auction with constant approximation ratio of liquid welfare under the assumption of large market.

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