Some restrictions on conditional imperatives

While certain imperatives receive a conditional interpretation similar to that assigned to if-clauses, not every if-clause can be paraphrased by the corresponding imperative. Bolinger (1977) attempts to account for this in terms of what he calls intrinsic consequence, while Ibanez (1976) feels that the requirement is that conditional imperatives must possess a generic subject. However, neither of these restrictions seems to account adequately for the data. It is shown that, in the imperative construction, the speech act performed by uttering the second conjunct must be dependent for its validity on the condition's being fulfilled. In this respect, imperatives can be contrasted with if-clauses, which may represent conditions, not on the validity of a speech act, but only on its relevance. Moreover, a further constraint on conditional imperatives is that they may not refer to a reality, but only to an eventuality. The oddity of certain conditional imperatives which contain stative verbs is then explained by the fact that such verbs are understood to designate presently existing states, i.e. realities, unless the context excludes this interpretation. While the first clause of each of the following examples syntactically resembles an imperative, it has often been observed that such clauses receive a conditional interpretation. (1) Make one mistake and there'll be trouble. (2) Don't report for duty and you'll get the sack. (3) Sit down and I'll make you some coffee. In (3), the imperative could also receive the kind of directive interpretation usually felt to be typical of non-conjoined imperatives, but in (1) and (2) this interpretation seems inappropriate. In what follows we shall be mainly concerned with those cases where only the conditional interpretation is available. 0024-3949/79/0017-1039 $2.00 Linguistics 17 (1979), 1039-1054. © Mouton Publishers, The Hague 1040 Eirlys E. Davies The directive interpretation may be unavailable for any of a number of reasons. For instance, the implied subject of the imperative may be other than the addressee: (4) Give you a present and you don't appreciate it. (5) Make themselves presentable and they can come. The reference may be to past time: (6) Give him a smile and he was your friend for life. The clause may refer to an event or state which cannot be viewed as under the control of the addressee, and which the addressee can therefore not be directed to bring about: (7) Receive an invitation and you'll have to attend. (8) Fall ill and you'll miss the concert. Finally, the clause may contain any as a counterspecifier of quantity, which seems to be incompatible with the directive interpretation. (9) Say any more and you'll be in serious trouble. Accordingly, it has been variously suggested, assumed, or explicitly argued that these conditional imperatives should be related to //-clauses (Lees, 1964; Ross, 1972; Lawler, 1975; Silva and Zwicky, 1975; Bolinger, 1967, 1977). However, examination of a range of examples suggests that conditional imperatives are restricted in ways in which //-clauses are not; for not every //-clause possesses an imperative paraphrase. This fact is noted by Culicover (1971) and discussed by Bolinger (1967, 1977), who attempts to formulate a restriction which can account for it. The consequence requirement In order to discuss Bolinger's approach, it is necessary to identify the data he intended it to account for. The examples below (10-25) are therefore quoted from Bolinger (1977, 161-164), and the judgements of grammaticality are his. (10) If you find any tickets, we'll go to the movies. (11) *Find any tickets and we'll go to the movies. (12) If you write any letters I'll mail them for you. (13) *Write any letters and I'll mail them for you. (14) If you like her I'll introduce you to her. (15) *Like her and I'll introduce you to her. Some restrictions on conditional imperatives 1041 (16) Like her and her friends will love you. (17) If you own this property I'll buy it from you. (18) *Own this property and I'll buy it from you. (19) Own a piece of property and you get taxed unmercifully. (20) If you understand Chinese I need you for a teacher. (21) *Understand Chinese and I need you for a teacher. (22) Understand Chinese and you can get any of these jobs. (23) If you are John Smith this message is for you. (24) *Be John Smith and this message is for you. (25) Be sick and they put you to bed. Bolinger feels that each of the examples he stars is ungrammatical for the same reason; the problem is that in each case the second clause does not express an intrinsic consequence of the fulfilment of the condition. The corresponding [/-clauses are perfectly acceptable because the requirement of intrinsic consequence does not apply to them. However, it is not immediately clear from the examples what exactly constitutes an 'intrinsic consequence'. Nor does Bolinger develop the notion very clearly in his discussion. For example, consider his statement: '"Imperative" conditions are limited to those whose consequences are the automatic result of the condition.' (Bolinger, 1977: 162). Ibanez (1976) is puzzled by this remark, and gives as a counterexample (26), which he says most German speakers find grammatical: (26) Arbeite hart und du bekommst vielleicht eine Gehaltserhöhung. 'Work hard and perhaps you'll get a rise' (Ibanez, 1976: 241). Evidently he thinks Bolinger is distinguishing between something which must result from the condition's fulfilment and something which may result. This distinction, however, seems to have no relevance at all for the grammaticality of (10H25), and can hardly be supposed to be the one Bolinger intended to make, since he gives no examples of the type of (26). In any case, the distinction exists only at a very trivial level, for surely even (26) can be said to designate an automatic consequence; it is simply that here the consequence is not the getting of a rise, but the possibility of getting one. This would of course be made obvious were perhaps to be analysed as a higher predicate — as Bolinger himself has pointed out (personal communication). Similarly, in examples like (27) and (28), it is in each case a possibility which automatically follows from the satisfaction of the condition: (27) Go now and there's a chance you'll catch him. (28) Own a house and you might be able to get a loan. 1042 Eirlys E. Davies Unfortunately, then, Ibanez, confused by Bolinger's admittedly misleading use of the term automatic, has completely misunderstood the latter's intention. Finding this automatic/non-automatic distinction quite irrelevant, as indeed it is, he finally rejects Bolinger's notion of intrinsic consequence as superfluous. In so doing, however, he overlooks the whole question of the kind of relations which may hold between the two conjuncts of such constructions, and so ignores a distinction which Bolinger at least hints at. Bolinger talks of consequences which are not intrinsic, but says nothing of the nature of these other consequences. He does however refer to Outlandish pseudo-conditions' (1977, 162), giving the example: (29) There's a man in your office, if you want to see him. Similar examples can easily be found: (30) I'm very interested in foreign stamps, if you get any letters from abroad. (30) If you find any money, John is looking for some he lost. (32) If you fancy a shower, the water's hot. (33) If you like swimming, there's a swimming pool just down the road. In such cases, the function of the //-clause seems to be to justify the utterance of the main clause by indicating the conditions under which it is relevant. The truth of the assertion is not affected by whether or not the condition is satisfied; it is only the relevance or appropriacy of this which is affected. It is in fact just this type of justificatory //-clause which has no imperative paraphrase. (34) ?Get any letters from abroad and I'm very interested in foreign stamps. (35) ?Find any money and John is looking for some he lost. (36) ?Fancy a shower and the water's hot. These //-clauses can be contrasted with others which clearly have a different function. For instance, the relation between the two clauses may be the logical one of implication; if the first is true, then so is the second. (37) If you think that you are a fool. (38) If you pass first time you must be a genius. Alternatively, the second clause may serve to indicate a result which will follow the realisation of the hypothesis expressed by the //-clause. (39) If you leave now, you'll be sorry. (40) If you make a mistake the test will be ruined. Some restrictions on conditional imperatives 1043 These types of relations can equally well be expressed by the imperative construction. (41) Think that and you're a fool. (42) Leave now and you'll be sorry. It remains to provide a formulation of the restriction on imperative conditionals which makes (41) and (42) acceptable but not (34)-(36). The distinction between the relevance type of condition and all others is drawn by Palmer (1974), who suggests that the others can be grouped together as 'mere variations upon the notion of the truth of one statement depending on the truth of another' (Palmer, 1974: 143). One might then attempt to state the restriction on conditional imperatives in terms of such truth dependency, suggesting that such a construction is possible just in case the truth of the assertion is dependent on whether the proposition expressed by the imperative can be asserted as true. However, such a formulation is quickly seen to be inadequate. For one can find examples of imperative conditionals where the truth of the assertion made by the second clause does not depend on the condition's being fulfilled, yet which seem perfectly acceptable. (43) Get into any difficulties and there's a phone number you can ring. (44) Find yourself at a loose end and there's always the television. (45) Tell Fred that and I wonder what he'll say. The relations bet