Negotiation and Cooperation in Multi-Agent Environments

Abstract Automated intelligent agents inhabiting a shared environment must coordinate their activities. Cooperation—not merely coordination—may improve the performance of the individual agents or the overall behavior of the system they form. Research in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) addresses the problem of designing automated intelligent systems which interact effectively. DAI is not the only field to take on the challenge of understanding cooperation and coordination. There are a variety of other multi-entity environments in which the entities coordinate their activity and cooperate. Among them are groups of people, animals, particles, and computers. We argue that in order to address the challenge of building coordinated and collaborated intelligent agents, it is beneficial to combine AI techniques with methods and techniques from a range of multi-entity fields, such as game theory, operations research, physics and philosophy. To support this claim, we describe some of our projects, where we have successfully taken an interdisciplinary approach. We demonstrate the benefits in applying multi-entity methodologies and show the adaptations, modifications and extensions necessary for solving the DAI problems

[1]  Michael P. Wellman A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems , 1993, J. Artif. Intell. Res..

[2]  Chester Louis Karrass The negotiating game : how to get what you want , 1992 .

[3]  Bernardo A. Huberman,et al.  The ecology of computation , 1988, Digest of Papers. COMPCON Spring 89. Thirty-Fourth IEEE Computer Society International Conference: Intellectual Leverage.

[4]  Jörg P. Müller,et al.  A Model for Cooperative Transportation Scheduling , 1995, ICMAS.

[5]  George L. Nemhauser,et al.  The Set-Partitioning Problem: Set Covering with Equality Constraints , 1969, Oper. Res..

[6]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. , 1945 .

[7]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Task Allocation Via Coalition Formation Among Autonomous Agents , 1995, IJCAI.

[8]  A. Michalos Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations , 1982 .

[9]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Coalition Formation Among Autonomous Agents: Strategies and Complexity , 1993, MAAMAW.

[10]  David S. Johnson,et al.  Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness , 1978 .

[11]  William A. Kraus,et al.  Collaboration in organizations: Alternatives to hierarchy , 1980 .

[12]  A. H. Bond An Analysis of Problems and Research in DAI , 1988 .

[13]  Anatol Rapoport,et al.  Theories of Coalition Formation , 1998 .

[14]  Klaus Fischer,et al.  A DAI approach to modeling the transportation domain , 1993 .

[15]  Victor R. Lesser,et al.  Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents , 1995, IJCAI.

[16]  Egon Balas,et al.  On the Set-Covering Problem , 1972, Oper. Res..

[17]  Michael E. Bratman,et al.  Shared Cooperative Activity , 1991 .

[18]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Collaborative Plans for Group Activities , 1993, IJCAI.

[19]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[20]  Michael N. Huhns,et al.  A Multi-Agent Environment for Department of Defense Distribution , 1995, Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems.

[21]  Tad Hogg,et al.  Social Dilemmas in Computational Ecosystems , 1995, IJCAI.

[22]  Douglas W. Gage,et al.  Command Control for Many-Robot Systems , 1992 .

[23]  T. Schelling The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[24]  Alan H. Bond,et al.  Readings in Distributed Artificial Intelligence , 1988 .

[25]  Morton D. Davis,et al.  The kernel of a cooperative game , 1965 .

[26]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Multiagent Negotiation under Time Constraints , 1995, Artif. Intell..

[27]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  A strategic negotiations model with applications to an international crisis , 1993, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern..

[28]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  DESIGNING AND BUILDING A NEGOTIATING AUTOMATED AGENT , 1995, Comput. Intell..

[29]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Formation of overlapping coalitions for precedence-ordered task-execution among autonomous agents * , 1996 .

[30]  Robert C. Ford,et al.  Organization Theory: An Integrative Approach , 1988 .

[31]  Jeffrey S. Rosenschein,et al.  Rules of Encounter - Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation among Computers , 1994 .

[32]  Eric R. Zieyel Operations research : applications and algorithms , 1988 .

[33]  A. Rubinstein Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model , 1982 .

[34]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  On the Emergence of Social Conventions: Modeling, Analysis, and Simulations , 1997, Artif. Intell..

[35]  A. Rubinstein,et al.  Bargaining and Markets , 1991 .

[36]  Douglas H. Norrie,et al.  A Multi-Agent Intelligent Design System Integrating Manufacturing and Shop-Floor Control , 1995, ICMAS.

[37]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  Controlling Cooperative Problem Solving in Industrial Multi-Agent Systems Using Joint Intentions , 1995, Artif. Intell..

[38]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  A Kernel-Oriented Model for Coalition-Formation in General Environments: Implementation and Results , 1996, AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1.

[39]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Reaching Agreements Through Argumentation: A Logical Model and Implementation , 1998, Artif. Intell..

[40]  Mark R. Cutkosky,et al.  Design Space Navigation as a Collaborative Aid , 1994 .

[41]  Lavinia Hall Negotiation: Strategies for Mutual Gain , 1992 .

[42]  Pattie Maes,et al.  Kasbah: An Agent Marketplace for Buying and Selling Goods , 1996, PAAM.

[43]  Tucker R. Balch,et al.  Motor Schema-Based Formation Control for Multiagent Robot Teams , 1995, ICMAS.

[44]  T. Schelling,et al.  The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .

[45]  R. Fisher,et al.  Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in , 1981 .

[46]  West Balcones,et al.  Design space navigation as a collaborative aid , 1993 .

[47]  M. Chwe Farsighted Coalitional Stability , 1994 .

[48]  E. Rowland Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , 1946, Nature.

[49]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Coordination without Communication: Experimental Validation of Focal Point Techniques , 1997, ICMAS.

[50]  Edmund H. Durfee,et al.  A Formal Study of Distributed Meeting Scheduling , 1998 .

[51]  Vasek Chvátal,et al.  A Greedy Heuristic for the Set-Covering Problem , 1979, Math. Oper. Res..

[52]  Victor R. Lesser,et al.  Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents , 1997, Artif. Intell..

[53]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Emergent Cooperative Goal-Satisfaction in Large Scale Automated-Agent Systems , 1999, Artif. Intell..

[54]  Egon Balas,et al.  On the Set-Covering Problem: II. An Algorithm for Set Partitioning , 1972, Oper. Res..

[55]  A. Marty Getting to YES. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In , 1983 .

[56]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Agents Contracting Tasks in Non-Collaborative Environments , 1993, AAAI.

[57]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  Collaborative Plans for Complex Group Action , 1996, Artif. Intell..

[58]  E. Rasmussen Games and Information , 1989 .

[59]  Sarit Kraus,et al.  An Overview of Incentive Contracting , 1996, Artif. Intell..

[60]  Anatol Rapoport,et al.  N-Person Game Theory , 1970 .

[61]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations , 1993, AAAI.

[62]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games And Decisions , 1958 .