Setting the Upset Price in British Columbia Timber Auctions

SUMMARY An important element of timber auctions is the upset—the minimum acceptable price, often called the reserve price in other auction environments. The upset has three main purposes: (1) to guarantee substantial revenue in auctions where competition is weak but the upset is met, (2) to limit the incentive for—and the impact of—collusive bidding, and (3) to provide useful information to bidders. We analyze the determination of the upset in British Columbia timber auctions. Setting the upset too high results in unsold stands and produces an upward bias in price if the competitive auctions are used to determine stumpage rates for non-auctioned timber. Setting the upset too low will reduce auction revenue and can create downward bias when the auction prices are used to calculate timber prices for non-auctioned stands. It is therefore important to set the upset at or near the optimal level. We present the theory of upset pricing and then apply that theory to the data available from historical timber auction sales in the BC Interior from 1999 to 2000. We find that an upset of about 70 percent (a rollback of 30 percent) maximizes auction revenues if the Ministry values timber at about 52 to 56 percent of its appraised value. This upset strikes the right balance between enhanced revenues and unsold timber stands. Given its importance, this upset calibration should be refined as additional data becomes available to assure that the upset is not set too high or too low.