Procurement mechanisms and the emergence of new governance structures in the CEECs: evidence from the Bulgarian wine industry

Abstract During transition, Bulgaria witnessed the dismantling of communist agri-food supply channels and a weakening of contract enforcement mechanisms. Wineries have had to establish grape procurement and purchasing relationships with a more diverse set of growers and intermediaries. In an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of procurement via spot markets, they have sought more interdependent contractual forms that secure greater control over the quality of inputs and minimise the possibility of opportunistic behaviour. The desired option by wineries is complete backward integration but attempts to achieve this have been limited by fragmented land ownership, credit constraints and incomplete property rights.

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