Pay inequity effects on back-office employees’ job performances: the case of a large insurance firm

Using personnel data on back-office employees of an insurance company, we investigate the effect of pay inequity—as measurable and, hence, perceivable by an individual—on the particular individual’s job performance. We calculate three measures of pay inequity, “inequality,” “envy,” and “altruism,” for total pay as well as, separately, for three pay components, salary, commissions, and year-end bonuses. Job performance is measured by the value of commissions for new contracts that accrue to the sales agents who are serviced by the back-office employee. Quantile panel regressions show that inequity effects on performance distinctly differ over the performance distribution and across the different pay components. Further, results depend on the time structure of pay and, possibly also, on pay secrecy rules.

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