Parties, ideology and elections: the politics of federal revenues and expenditures forecasting

Some scholars view problems in the accuracy of federal fiscal forecasts as being largely technical in nature .Others intimate that there may be a political component as well. This paper exlpores the relative merits of these two perspectives finding some support for each. Executive forecasts were found to be random with respect to direction of errors , error magnitudes increased in absolute terms over time , and revenues estimate error s tended to cluster in short bursts. Executive forecasting errors were also linked to presidential party , ideology and year in the election cycle.

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