Should We Care about Fine-Tuning?

There is an ongoing debate over cosmological fine-tuning between those holding that design is the best explanation and those who favor a multiverse. A small group of critics has recently challenged both sides, charging that their probabilistic intuitions are unfounded. If the critics are correct, then a growing literature in both philosophy and physics lacks a mathematical foundation. In this paper, I show that just such a foundation exists. Cosmologists are now providing the kinds of measure-theoretic arguments needed to make the case for fine-tuning. 1. Introduction2. Probability and infinite sets 2.1 No probability function 2.2 Arbitrary and wrong probability functions3. The measure of the universe4. The coarse-tuning objection5. Arbitrariness and error6. Conclusion Introduction Probability and infinite sets 2.1 No probability function 2.2 Arbitrary and wrong probability functions 2.1 No probability function 2.2 Arbitrary and wrong probability functions The measure of the universe The coarse-tuning objection Arbitrariness and error Conclusion